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1. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Boise State University adopts, by reference, its statement of the Course of Proceedings
set forth in the Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Boise State University adopts, by reference, the Statement of Facts set forth

111

the

Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal.

III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL
1.

Zylstra has waived any argument the district court elTed when it concluded that

medical testimony was necessary to establish causation in order to avoid BSU's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
2.

Zylstra has waived any argument the district court erred when it granted, in part,

the BSU Motion to Strike portions of the affidavits of Stephanie Zylstra, Helen Zylstra, JefT
Dolifka and Dale Dolifka.
3.

Zylstra has waived any argument that, after the district coU!1 granted, in part,

BSU's Motion to Strike, the remaining record established an issue of material fact sufficient to
avoid summary judgment.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIE\V
When reviewing a decision to strike affidavit testimony on evidentiary grounds offered in
connection with a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's evidentiary ruling is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 307 P.3d
176 (2013); Gem State IllS. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.3d 172 (2007). The appellant
must demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion and that its error atTected a substantial
right. See Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012). The
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admissibility of expert testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is
committed to the discretion of the trial court. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 366, 128 P.3d
903 (2005). If the trial court's discretion is affected by an error of law, the appellate court
"is to note the en-or made and remand the case for appropriate findings." Gem State IllS. Co. v.

Hutchison, 145 Idaho at 16.

V.ARGUMENT
A.

Any Arguments Challenging Portions Of The District Court's Ruling That are Not
Set Forth in Zylstra's Opening Brief Are Waived.
Under the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant's opening brief must include

a statement of the issues presented on appeal, and an argument. See I.A.R. 35(a)(4) and (6). The
argument section must identity the legal issues to be considered and provide statutory or case
authority supporting the issues the appellant feels the appellate court should consider. See I.A.R.

35(a)(6). The appellate courts \vill not consider any issue which is not supported by propositions
of law, authority, or argument. See Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483,490, 927 P.2d 873, 880
(1996); Thomas v. l"Uedical Center Physiciam, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205-206, 61 P.3d 557, 562-

563 (2001); Gem State Ills. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 16, 175 P.3d 172, 178 (2007). The
failure to raise legal issues in an appellant's opening brief v\<'ill preclude the appellate courts n"om
addressing those matters. See Sun V(llley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
87,803 P.2d 993 (1991); State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 737,740,890 P.2d 323,326 (1995); State
v. Raudeb{lugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993). The Supreme Court will not

consider issues raised for the first time in the reply brief. Id.
The district court made three significant rulings that are not challenged in Zylstra's
opening brief. First, the court ruled that, as part of his prima facie case, Zylstra was required to
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present expert medical testimony establishing his injuries were caused by the decision of the
BSU athletic staff to allow him to continue participating in the PAC-10 Tournament after he \vas
injured m his first match.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 109, L. 9; p. Ill, L.22. Second, the district court

granted, in part, BSU's Motion to Strike the affidavits of lay witnesses, Stephanie Zylstra, Helen
Zylstra, JetT Dolifl(a, and Dale Dolitka. Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 22; p. 80, L. 8; R. Vol. I, p. 730731. Third, after granting, in part, BSU's Motion to Strike, the district court ruled the record did
not establish a disputed issue of material fact concerning whether Zylstra's injuries and damages
were caused by his continued participation in the PAC-I0 Tournament after he was initially
injured. Tr. Vol. I, p. Ill, L. 23, p. 115, L. 16; R. Vol. I, p.733.
Lacking in Zylstra's opening appellate brief is any argument that he \vas not required to
establish causation through medical testimony.

Additionally, Zylstra's opening brief fails to

challenge the portions of the trial court's ruling striking, in part, the atTidavits of Stephanie
Zylstra, Helen Zylstra, JefT Dolitka, and Dale Dolitka. Finally, Zylstra's opening brief does not
discuss, or dispute that, in the absence of the atTidavits of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek, the record
does not create an issue of material fact that his injuries were caused by the decision to allow him
to continue wrestling in the tournament after he suffered his initial concussion.
Any argument that the district court's rulings on these three issues was erroneous is, at
this point, waived and cannot be raised in Zylstra'S reply brief. See Thomas v. "Medical Center
Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205-206, 61 P.3d 557, 562-563 (2001). Accordingly, the only
remaining issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it struck the affidavits of
Drs. Epperson and Brzusek. If the trial court did not abuse its discretion in that regard, its ruling
granting BSU's motion for summary judgment must be affirmed.
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B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Struck the Affidavits of
Dr. Epperson and Dr. Brzusek.
On June 4,2013, BSU filed its motion for summary judgment, R. Vol. I, p. 154-156,

437-455.

The motion was filed on the deadline established by the district court for filing

dispositive motions.

R. Vol. I, p. 21-24.

Zylstra's response included the affidavits of Drs.

Brzusek and Epperson. R. Vol. I, p. 508-538 and 539-554. BSU then filed a motion to strike
arguing the affidavits of the two expe11s offered opinion testimony that had not been previously
disclosed despite the fact those opinions had been requested through written discovery. R. Vol.
I, p. 562-563. The district court agreed and granted BSU's motion. Tr. Vol. I, p. 56, L.8; p. 72,
L. 21, R. Vol. I, p. 730.
1. Legal standard governing admissibility of evidence in summary
judgment proceedings.
Affidavits offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment are governed by
IRCP 56(e). The Rule requires affidavits contain testimony that would be admissible as if the
affiant were testifying at trial. See Carnell v. Barker Managemellt, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327, 48
P.3d 651, 656 (2002); Gem State IllS. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10,13,175 P.3d 172, 175
(2007). A trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony otfered in connection with
a motion for summary judgment is revie'vved for an abuse of discretion.

See Gem State

Insurance Co., 145 Idaho at 14-15; see also Hopper v. Swin11 ertoll , 2013 WL 6198245
(November 26, 2013). If affidavits are challenged, the trial court "must first make a threshold
detennination as to the admissibility of the evidence 'before proceeding to the ultimate issue,
whether summary judgment is appropriate. '"

Gem State Insurance Co. v. Hutchinsoll, 145

Idaho at 14. The decision ·'to exclude undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to l.R.C.P. 26
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(e)(4) is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho
176, 180,219 PJd 1192, 1196 (2009).
To detennine whether a district court has abused its discretion, this Court asks:
( I) Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.

See Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 87, 244 P.3d 224, 231 (2010); Sun Valley Shopping
Center, Illc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). In this case, the
district court granted BSe's motion to strike the Brzusek and Epperson affidavits because
Zylstra was offering expert opinion testimony that had not been previously disclosed. Tr. VoL I,
p. 56, L. 8; p. 72, L. 21. The court advised counsel for Zylstra that its ruling was not a sanction.
Tr. VoL I, p. 160, L.16-25. Instead, the court was addressing a motion to strike brought pursuant
to IRCP 56( e) and detem1ining whether the disputed evidence was admissible.
In Hopper v. Swillltertolt, supra, this Court considered whether a trial court had abused
its discretion when it struck an untimely affidavit. The trial co1ll1's ruling was affinned because
it recognized the issue as one of discretion and "applied the correct legal standards because it
analyzed the admissibility of the affidavits under IRCP 56(e)". Id. at *4. "[B]ecause the district
court correctly identified [the] evidentiary decisions as calling for the exercise of its discretion,
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and
reached its decisions by an exercise of reason, it did not abuse its discretion in striking" the
ofTending affidavits. Id.
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2. Factors considered by the District Court when it struck the affidavits of
Brzusek and Epperson.

On July 23, 2012, Zylstra provided answers to BSU's First Set of IntelTogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents. R. Vol. I, p. 50, 57-58. IntelTogatory No.4 and Request
for Production i'Jo. 1 asked Zylstra to identify experts who would testify at trial. Zylstra was
asked to "state the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the
facts the expert has reviewed and is relying upon, and any and all opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify." R. Vol. I, p. 57. Zylstra was also asked to produce copies of the expert's
current cUlTiculum vitae, copies of materials the experts had reviewed in connection with the
litigation and, all reports and draft reports they had authored. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Other than the
report of Dr. Epperson, no other expert reports or materials were identified or produced prior to
the filing of the BSU motion for summary judgment. [d.
On April 8, 2013, almost a year after answering BSU's written discovery Zylstra
submitted his expert disclosures as required by the court's scheduling order. R. Vol. I, p, 23; 61120. Dr. Brzusek was identified as an expert witness. Id. The disclosure identified areas of
potential testimony for Epperson and Brzusek but, failed to describe any specific opinions
addressing medical causation.

R. Vol. I, p. 62-63.

1

On April 10, 2013, counsel for BSC

communicated with Zylstra's attorney outlining deficiencies in plaintiff's answ'ers to discovery
relating to expert witnesses and the fact the expert disclosure failed to disclose the actual
opinions that would be offered by the various expert witnesses at trial. R. Vol. 1, p. 126-127.

i Zylstra had produced the Epperson report.
R. Vol. I, p. 58. Hov:ever, the report did not offer
an opinion on medical causation and stated more information was needed to determine whether
lylstra suffered additional II1juries by continuing to participate in the tournament. R. Vol. I, p.
64; see also § C( I), infra.

RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS STATE OF IDAHO, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY'S
RESPONSE BRIEF - 6

Counsel responded stating "I do not agree with you that there is an obligation to provide full
opinions and suppOliing materials by the deadline for disclosure of expert opinions." R. Vol. I,
p. 129. Thereafter. on April 12,2013, BSU filed a motion to compel. R. VoL I., p. 39.
At the May 9, 2013, hearing, BSU argued that Zylstra's expert disclosures and answers to
discovery were inadequate because he had refused to provide the actual opinions to which his
expert witnesses would testify at trial. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 1-17. The motion was not limited to
Drs. Brzusek and Epperson. [d. The trial court agreed stating:
THE COURT: Well, if what you're referring to and I'm looking
at the plaintiffs list of experts, for example, that was attached to
your affidavit. If what you're referring to is what they essentially
said here are categories they're going to testify to, then 1 would
agree with you, Mr. Collaer, that's not sufficient and doesn't
answer Interrogatory No.4, nor does it respond to Request for
Production No.1, that in this case you can't just say here's the
general subject matter. You've got to disclose the actual opinions
they're going to testify to, otherwise there's no point in having
your there's nothing for your experts to respond to. And if that's
what you're talking about, than 1 would tend to agree with you.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 18 - p. 19, L.8. (emphasis added) Addressing the deficiency
of the Brzusek disclosure, the district court stated:

THE COURT: \Vell, I you know, with due respect, I'm looking
at the responses here on the plaintiffs list of experts and I don't
think you can avoid providing the material by simply saying, well,
they're not really experts, they are they are treating physicians.
Because, for example.

THE COURT: For - because I'm going to give you an example.
For example, you have a treating physician, Dr. Eggers, and he what you say is he can testify regarding his diagnosis, causation of
the condition, appropriateness of treatment and future treatment
and prognosis. Now, clearly he can talk about future treatment.
He can talk about what he did. What he can't do is talk about
causation because that's expert opinion.
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But if you're going to be talking about causation or you're
talking about things like - if he's going to talk about issues related
to concussions in general, post-concussive symptoms, there's you're really walking a very fine line and you may find yourself
here at trial up a creek. And so I think that's something you need
to think about.
Tr. VoL I, p. 19, L. 22 - p. 22, L. 3. The court concluded by warning Zylstra:
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's a possibility, but I will warn you
that in the cases that I've had before, one of the things that happens
is that they - there's not a timely supplementation and that's
determined because you look at the dates that reports are received
and things like that, then you still run the risk that something could
be excluded.
So I guess what I'm saying to all parties here is remember
the purposes behind the rules is to provide a mechanism to insure
that discovery is robust and that neither party goes into a trial with
a hood over their eyes unless it's a hood of their own making. I
think that's what I was trying to tell Mr. Collaer is the way I read
the Idaho rules whereas the federal rules now basically put all the
burden on the parties to disclose without any action on the part of a
party. I don't think the Idaho rules have gone that far. And I think

Tr. Vo!.I, p. 22, L.14 - p. 23, L.8. (emphasis added)
BSU then posed the hypothetical situation where an element of the plaintiffs prima facie
case required expert testimony and, until a motion for summary judgment was filed at the
dispositive motion deadline, the plaintiff had failed to disclose expert opinions needed to support
their claim. BSU suggested that scenario would cause the defendant to file a motion to strike
expert opinions disclosed for the first time to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Tr. Vo!'
I, p. 24, L.l 0-24. The trial court responded stating:
THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you the way I see this. I'm not going
to rule in a vacuum. I'm probably fairly well known as being
pretty strict with the rules and pretty strict with the pre-trial orders.
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[t would be an extraordinary situation for me to allow someone
close to trial to change the opinions such that it would prejudice
the othcr side.

So, I guess, that's the only way - I can't tell you that it's
necessarily going to be granted, but I can tell you that I'm not
afraid of granting it. So - but I can't rule in a vacuum because 1
don't know what the circumstances are.
And the reason I'm saying that is that I have had an
occasion where new a new medical problem arose subsequent to
discovery. So I'm not going to say, \·ve II , that's just tough. That's
- it may result in the trial being changed if that were to occur. But
so I'm not going to give you a ruling in advance.
If that occurs if your scenario occurs, I can assure you
that 1 do believe in enforcing the rules, so Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, L.22.
Following the motion to compel hearing, the parties continued with discovery and
preparing for trial. Despite the hypothetical posed by BSU at the May 9, 2013, hearing and, the
waming the trial court provided to Zylstra that his expert disclosures were not adequate, Zylstra
did not supplement his answers to discovery or his expert disclosures prior to the discovery cutotT or the dispositive motion deadline. BSU filed its motion for summary judgment on June 4,
2013, the date established as the deadline for dispositive motions. R. Vol. I, p. 22 and 154. The
affidavits of Epperson and Brzusek provided new opinions addressing the critical issue of
medical causation. R. Vol. I, p. 511-513 and p. 543-544. The trial court concluded the affidavits
contained new opinions, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 60, L. 4 - p. 66, L. 15; and explained why the new
opinions were untimely. Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, L.16 - p. 72, L.21.
During the summary judgment hearing, Zylstra did not offer an excuse for his failure to
provide earlier supplementation. Instead, he argued his prior disclosures were adequate because
they placed BSU on notice that more detailed opinions would be developed and offered at trial.
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Tr. Vol. I, p. 40, L.22 - 25; p. 80, L. 17-22. This argument was rejected \'/ith tbe trial court
stating that notice through the identification of general subject matters was insufficient as Zylstra
was required, by the court's scheduling order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to provide
the experts' actual opinions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 80, L.23

p. 81, L.Il. This ruling mirrored the courts

prior comments and warnings it provided at tbe May 9, 2013 bearing. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 18 - p.
19, L.8. Addressing the Zylstra's failure to timely supplement his disclosures, the court wrote:

There is no excuse. Brzusek only met Zylstra and his wife
six days after summary judgment was filed, six days after
discovery was then to have been initiated and more than two weeks
after rebuttal experts should bave been disclosed and his opinion
was disclosed for the first time after discovery had been ... had been
completed. These opinions were not seasonably supplemented.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 67, L.16-24.
Addressing the opinions of Dr. Epperson, the court wrote:
In addition, in the face of an express warning issued by this
Court, at this point the plaintiff had an opportunity to immediately
seasonably supplement those. The information upon which Dr.
Epperson relied could have been looked at and immediately bave
an update of bis expert opinion. That did not happen. Tbey could
bave - if they had thought tbat Mr.-Dr.- I can't remember his name
Brzusek was appropriate, he could have immediately had an
examination and supplemented that. Neither thing was done.
Instead, the plaintiff waited until the motion was filed and at that
time sprang new and different opinions on the plaintiff. [sic] For
that reason, I strike both affidavits.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 7-21.
The trial court's comments demonstrate it reached the decision to strike the otTending
affidavits through an exercise of reason. The court described the deficiencies in the contents of
the affidavits, the circumstances surrounding both of the experts developing new previoLlsly
undisclosed opinions and, why the disclosure of those new opinions after BSU's motion for
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summary judgment had been filed was untimely and, without legal excuse. The district court
clearly recognized its ability to grant the motion to strike was within its discretion. It reached its
decision by an exercise of reason and consistent with the applicable legal standards.

3. The District Court's ruling was consistent with applicable legal
standards.
The determination of whether an affidavit that is filed in connection with a motion for
summary judgment is admissible is a threshold question the trial court must address before
determining whether an issue of fact exists in the record. See Hopper v. SWil111erton, supra,

citing JUB Engineers vs. SCC Insurance Co. of Hartfortl, 146 Idaho 311, 314-315, 193 P.3d
858,861-862 (2008). In Carnell vs. Barker 111anagemellt, IIlC., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651
(2002) the trial court struck an affidavit offered to oppose a motion for summary judgment on
evidentiary and procedural grounds. Prior to the summary judgment proceedings, the district
court had granted plaintiffs motion seeking permission to depose a non-witness expert who had
removed evidence from the scene of the fire.

The plaintiff's motion was supported by the

affidavit of a retained expert, George Bidstrup, who testified "to determine the cause of the fire
and render an opinion on the fire's origin, he needed to speak to the person who had removed
crucial evidence from the situs of the fire." Id. at 326. Thereafter, plaintiffs never conducted
the depositions authorized by the court or, made arrangements to meet with the witnesses. Id.
To oppose the defendant's motion for summary jUdgment, the plaintiff provided a second
affidavit of Mr. Bidstrup containing opinion testimony addressing the origin of the fire and,
establishing causation. This affidavit was stricken on evidentiary grounds in addition to the fact
Mr. Bidstrup had not been disclosed as an expert witness in violation of the court's scheduling
order. /(f. at 326.
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On appeal, Carnell argued the defendants ''\vere aware of appellant's intention to use
Bidstrup as an expert, so no prejudice resulted from untimely disclosure." [d. at 327. Carnell
also argued the trial court should have altered the scheduling order and allowed her to identify
Bidstmp as a retained expert after the defendants filed their motion for summary judgment
challenging causation. These arguments were rejected with this Court concluding the trial court
had not abused its discretion when it struck the second Bidstmp affidavit after providing the
plaintiffs "[t]ime extensions to obtain expert testimony, ordered physical evidence removed from
the tire situs to be given to appellants for their California expert to analyze, and granted
appellants' permission to depose !tchon, a non-witness expert."

/d. at 32S.

Despite these

accommodations, the plaintiff never conducted the requested discovery and, never disclosed a
causation expert. The suggestion the trial court should have extended the time to allow plaintiff
to supplement the Bidstmp affidavit was rejected with this Court reasoning "[t]he appellants had
ample notice of the hearing and knew what was required of them to survive the summary
judgment motions." /d. at 329. In the absence of the second Bidstrup affidavit, the plaintiff
could not create an issue of fact concerning the issue of causation. Id. at 32S.
[n this case, the district court engaged in a very similar analysis. At the May 9, 20 l3,
hearing, Zylstra was warned that his expert disclosures and answers to interrogatories and
requests for production of documents were deficient. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L.lS - p. 19, L.S. He was
specifically told that identifying the general subjects upon which his experts may ultimately offer
opinions was not a sufficient response. [d. Despite having the benefit of the court's direction
and warnings, Zylstra failed to supplement his expert disclosures or answers to written discovery
to include opinions held by Drs. Epperson and Brzusek addressing the critical issue of medical
causation. He also ignored the trial court's response to the hypothetical scenario posed by BSU
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which clearly suggested a motion for summary judgment would be forthcoming and, that any
undisclosed expert opinions offered to oppose the motion would cause BSU to file a motion to
strike. Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L.I 0 - p. 25, L. 22.
Because Zylstra failed to supplement his expert disclosures, the hypothetical scenano
posed by BSU at the May 9, 2013, hearing became a reality. BSU's motion, like the dispositive
motion at issue in Carnell v. Barker Management, Inc., supra, alleged the defendant's actions
did not cause the plaintiff's injuries. BSU further argued Zylstra was required to prove causation
with expert testimony. R. Vol. I, p. 451-454. After BSU's motion was filed, Zylstra was seen,
for the first time, by Dr. Brzusek.

R. Vol. I, p. 510 (Brzusek Aff'15).

Additionally, Dr.

Epperson was provided new information to review and was asked to provide opinions on the
issue of causation, which were not included in his earlier report. Tr. Vol. I, p. 61, L.19 - p. 62,
L.18; R. Vol. I, p. 542 (Epperson

Aff~8

and 9). See also § C(l), infra.

Consistent with its comments during the May 9, 2013 hearing, the trial court granted
BSU's motion to strike the Epperson and Brzusek affidavits. R. Vol. I, p. 730, Tr. Vol. I, p. 71,

L. I - p. 72, L.21. The reasoning the court provided is analogous to the approach taken by the
trial court in Carnell v Barker Management, Illc. where, despite the fact the challenged expert
had filed an earlier affidavit and it was unquestioned the defendants were aware that he would, at
some time, offer expert testimony on the issue of causation, the plaintiff was not relieved from
the obligation to disclose the expert and his opinions as required by the court's scheduling order
and, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See 137 Idaho at 328.

2

The fact BSU was advised that

The trial court in Carnell also ruled the opinions in the expert affidavit sufTered evidentiary
deficiencies which provided an alternative basis for striking the affidavit. See 137 Idaho at 326.
This Court concluded the evidentiary issues ,vere "immaterial because the appellants never
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Drs. Epperson and Brzusek may, at some time in the undisclosed future, develop opinions on the
issue of causation did not relieve Zylstra from his obligation to disclose the actual opinions of his
l'xpert witnesses. See IRCP 26(b)(4). In fact, neither expert was asked to address the causation
issue until after BSU filed its motion for summary judgment. 3
At the October 10, 2013 hearing addressing the motion for reconsideration, Zylstra
admitted that, when the expert disclosures were originally filed, he was aware supplementation
was needed. His counsel advised the court: "Dr. Epperson is expected to testify that allowing
Mr. Zylstra to continue wrestling after his initial head injury caused additional damage and the
point was, yes, we need to amplify that." Tr. Vol. I, p. 137, L. 13-17. Counsel acknowledged
the obligation to supplement plaintiffs' disclosures by stating they were: "obligated to provide
more information in due course, which we were planning to do as soon as Dr. Brzusek had his
meeting with Mr. Zylstra." Tr. Vol. I, p. 137, L. 21-24. These statements are an admission
Zylstra was aware of the medical causation issues in early April, 2013, and that expert testimony
would be required to establish a prima facia case of negligence. Clearly, Zylstra "knew what
was required ... to survive the summary judgment motions." See Carnell, 137 Idaho at 329. The
fact the experts were not asked to provide opinions addressing causation until after BSU's
motion for summary judgment was filed confirms the trial court's ruling there was no reason the
opinions could not have been developed and disclosed earlier. Tr. Vol. I, p. 67, L. 16-24; p. 72
L.7-21.

disclosed Bidstrup as an expert witness in violation of the district court's scheduling order". Id.
at 328.
3 Dr. Brzusek did not meet with Zylstra and, therefore, did not have a factual basis to opine on
the causation issue, until after the motion for summary judgment was filed. R. Vol. I, p. 510. Dr.
Epperson, in his affidavit, admits he was not asked to otTer an opinion on medical causation or,
whether Zylstra was "insane" for purposes of tolling the notice of claim requirements, until after
the BSU motion was filed. R. Vol. I, p. 542 (Epperson affidavit, '19).
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In Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) this Court addressed the
question of when the supplementation of an expert opinion is "seasonable" as required by IRCP
26(e)(J )(8). Trial courts were instructed

to

ask "was the opposing party given an opportunityfor

.Iidl cross-examination'?" Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).

In Edmunds, the defendant, St.

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed
affidavits of Drs. Rotschafer and Hollander to oppose the motion. These affidavits were filed
eight months prior to trial. The affidavit of Dr. Rotschafer was stricken because he had not been
identified as an expert witness as required by the scheduling order.

This aspect of the trial

court's ruling was affirmed. See 142 Idaho at 873. The decision to strike the Hollander affidavit
was reversed because the doctor had been timely disclosed. The fact new opinions appeared in
his affidavit did not, automatically, require their exclusion as IRCP 26( e)(1 )(B) allows
supplementation of previously disclosed expert opinions. See 142 Idaho at 345. This Court
concluded the supplementation of Dr. Hollander's opinions through the challenged affidavit was
"seasonable" because the updated opinions were provided eight months prior to trial. See 142
Idaho at 872.
In this case, the trial court found the Zylstra's supplementation was not seasonable. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 70, L. 15 - p. 72, L. 21. Factors supporting the court's conclusions which establish its
ruling was an appropriate exercise of discretion include the fact that Zylstra was warned, and was
aware his expert disclosures required supplementation in May of 2013, long before discovery
was to be concluded and, before the dispositive motion cut-off.

The only reason new

information was ever provided to Drs. Brzusek and Epperson to address the medical causation
issue was the fact 8SU filed its motion for summary judgment.

At that point, the discovery

deadline had lapsed and the deadline for dispositive motions had expired. R. Vol. I, p. 21 - 23.
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In Edmunds v. Kraner, the challenged supplementation occUlTed eight months prior to
trial which also predated the dispositive motion deadline created by IRCP 56(b). In that case, the
defendant was not denied the opportunity to cross-exam Dr. Hollander prior to having its motion
for summary judgment considered. In this case, the late disclosure of Brzusek and Epperson's
causation opinions prevented BSU from cross-examining those individuals or being able to
challenge their opinions in connection with the motion for summary judgment. Additionally, as
recognized by the trial court, if the untimely supplementation was allowed, the court would have
been forced to vacate the trial. Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, L. 18 - p. 72, L. 21. Considering the lack of any
credible explanation regarding why the expert opinions were not disclosed earlier, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it concluded it would not vacate the trial and, that Zylstra had
failed to seasonably supplement his answers to discovery as required by [RCP 26( e)( 1)(B). This
is the same situation which caused the expert affidavit in Carnell v. Barker l11anagement, Inc.,
supra, to be stricken. See also Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 348,48 P.3d 672, 677 (2002) (Trial
did not abuse its discretion by excluding an expert witness's late-disclosed opinions where there
was no legitimate explanation why the opinions were not disclosed earlier.)
Based upon the foregoing, and consistent with this Court's rulings

Swinllerton, supra, Carnell vs. Barker

l~talUlgemellt,

JJ1

Hopper vs.

IIlC., supra, and Edmunds vs. Kraner,

supra, the district court correctly identified the evidentiary issues raised by the late disclosure of
the BrzLlsek and Epperson opinions and, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with applicable legal standards by striking those affidavits.

For that reason, the

district court's decision granting BSU's motion to strike the Brzusek and Epperson affidavits
should be aiTirmed.
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C.

Arguments Raised by Appellant that are not Supported by the Record.
(1) Dr. Epperson's opinions on medical causation contained in his affidavit were
"new" opinions.
Zylstra argues the opinions expressed by Drs. Epperson and Brzusek in their atlidavits

submitted in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment on July I, 2013, were not
"new." Appellant's Brief, p. 12-16. He claims there was prior disclosure of Dr. Epperson's
opinions on causation. Id. This contention is not supported by the record. On April 8, 2013,
Zylstra provided his List of Experts. R. Vol. I, p. 32-38. With respect to Dr. Epperson, Zylstra
stated that a copy of his "comprehensive report" was provided to BSU on January 28, 2012, and
that the doctor's testimony at trial "will be consistent with his report subject to modification
based on evidence developed after his evaluation was performed." R. Vol. I, p. 35.

As to

causation, Zylstra's disclosure simply indicated Dr. Epperson was "expected to testify" that it
was "likely" Zylstra suffered multiple lesser brain injuries during subsequent matches. /d.
In his "comprehensive report," Dr. Epperson did not render a definitive opinion on
causation, instead indicating additional information was needed to reach a conclusion on that
point. R. Vol. I, p. 582-605. Dr. Epperson stated:
He may have sustained additional concussions when he was put
back into matches in a state of post-traumatic amnesia. Further
information would be helpful, but prolonged post-traumatic
amnesia for four months suggests the likelihood of subsequent
concussions. The significant current brain dysfunction deficits
also suggest more than one concussion.

R. Vol. I, p. 603 (emphasis added).
After discussing the neuropsychological testing, Epperson concluded that "these
problems stem from his concussion or mUltiple concussions."

R. Vol. I, p. 604 (emphasis
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added). In other words, Dr. Epperson did not have an opinion regarding the critical causation
Issue.

He could not distinguish between the initial concussion and possible subsequent

concussions as causing Zylstra's alleged injuries or cognitive deficits.

4

This is the problem with

Dr. Epperson's opinions that Zylstra fails to comprehend. The opinions in the Epperson report
did not address the issue of medical causation. For that reason, the opinions expressed in Dr.
Epperson's affidavit were substantially different than the opinions expressed in his report. See R.
543-544 and 603-604 .
After receiving Zylstra's List of Experts, BSU sent him a letter indicating the disclosures
were inadequate because they did not contain a complete statement of all opinions to be
expressed. R. Vol. I, p. 126-127. In response, Zylstra disagreed that he was obligated to provide
full opinions at that time, stating his belief that the disclosures provided a clear picture of what
he expected his experts to say, and stating that a "very detailed repOli from Dr. Epperson" had
been provided. R. Vol. I, p. 129.
On April 12, 2013, BSU filed a motion to compel. R. Vol. I, p. 39-4l. The subject of the
motion was the adequacy of Zylstra's expert disclosures.

In response, Zylstra submitted the

affidavit of James Whitehead.

Mr. Whitehead testified that Dr.

R. Vol. I, p. l37-143.

Epperson's opinions had been provided "in the form of a comprehensive 24 - page report." R.
Vol. I, p. 140.

Lacking in either Drs. Epperson's or Brzusek's affidavits is any testimony stating Zylstra
actually suffered additional concussions in his later wrestling matches. R. 511-512 and 542-543.
Considering the video of the matches confirm he suffered no further blows to the head, R. 421
(Hoesch Aff. '12) highlights Dr. Epperson's statement that further information was needed to
reach an opinion regarding whether further injuries occurred or whether the concussion Zylstra
sufTered in the first match was aggravated by his continued participation in the tournament. R.
Vol. I, p. 603.

4
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At the May 9, 2013 hearing, Zylstra stated that Dr. Epperson's report had already been
provided along with everything else he had so far with respect to his experts. Tr. Vol. I, p. 16, L.
21

p. 19, L. l7-18. No supplementation was provided until Dr. Epperson's atlidavit was

submitted on July 1, 2013, in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment. R. Vol. I, p.
539-554. In his atlidavit, Dr. Epperson opined for the first time that, "with [a] reasonable degree
of neuropsychological and scientific probability ... Sam suffered additional damage as a result of
defendants' decision to allow him to continue wrestling after his first concussion." R. Vol. I, p.
543. 5 Dr. Epperson also opined, for the first time, that it was his opinion "again expressed with
reasonable neuropsychological or scientific probability, that Sam's ability to evaluate his
condition. and the extent and cause of his injuries, was compromised significantly. especially
during the first three or four months after the wrestling tournament." R. Vol. I, p. 544. These
opinions were not expressed in Dr. Epperson's report. R. Vol. I, p. 582-605. In his report, he
did not, and because he needed further information, could not, differentiate between Zylstra'S
initial concussion or possible subsequent concussion(s) as the cause of his alleged cognitive
deticits.() In contrast, in his atlidavit, Dr. Epperson differentiated between the concussions and
opined that the alleged subsequent concussions caused Zylstra's deficits which also rendered him

The suggestion Zylstra suffered additional injuries remains an incomplete and inadmissible
Op1l110n. The Epperson atlidavit fails to identify what injuries the doctor is referencing or,
\vhether those unidentified injuries were caused by allowing Zylstra to continue wrestling at the
tournament. "Expeli opinion that is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and therefore is inadmissible."
Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Serv., 143 Idaho 834, 838, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2002). Dr.
Epperson's new opinions concerning additional undescribed injuries are conc!usory, lack
foundation, and are therefore, inadmissible.
6 The question of whether Zylstra has cognitive deficits is disputed in the report authored by Dr.
Craig Beaver. R. Vol. I, p. 434; Aug R; 12118113, (Craig Beaver report).

5
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unable to evaluate his condition for purposes of complying with the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
These opinions were new and, were not disclosed prior to BSU's motion for summary judgment.
In opposition to BSU's motion to strike, Zylstra changed his characterization of Dr.
Epperson's report. Instead of being a "comprehensive report" it became a "preliminary report"
in \vhich Dr. Epperson was not asked to express any opinions on the basis of reasonable medical
or scientific probability.

R. Vol. I, p. 620. 7

Zylstra also argued that the language in Dr.

Epperson's report and Zylstra's List of Experts put BSU "on notice" that it was "likely" Dr.
Epperson would testify, "if asked," that in his opinion, allowing Zylstra to continue wrestling
after his initial concussion had caused additional damage. R. Vol. I, p. 620-621.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not suggest that it is sufficient if an expert
disclosure puts the opposing party "on notice" of what the experts opinions are likely to be "if
asked." Pursuant to Rule 26(b)( 4), parties are allowed to discover by interrogatory "a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore."

Zylstra's

argument is also inconsistent with the holdings in Carnell v. Barker It1al1agement, Inc., supra.
and Clark v. Raty, supra.

BSU was entitled to discover the actual opinions held by Dr.

Epperson. While Zylstra's List of Experts stated that Dr. Epperson was expected to testify about
causation, his disclosure and answers to written discovery did not identify those opinions. BSU
was advised Dr. Epperson would testify consistent with his report.

R. Vol I, p. 35.

Dr.

Epperson's report did not inc lude the opinions expressed in his affidavit. Therefore, the opinions
expressed in the affidavit were new and, as found by the district court, untimely.

; On appeal, Zylstra reverts back to characterizing Dr. Epperson's report as an "extensive report"
and "thorough report." Appellant's Br., p. 11 and 13.
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(2) Dr. Brzusek's opinions on medical causation contained in his affidavit were
"new" opinions.
Zylstra concedes that he did not have, and did not disclose, Dr. Brzusek's opinions on
causation until after BSU filed its motion for summary judgment.

Appellant's Br., p. 17.

Instead, he argues that Dr. Brzusek's opinions were not "new" because they did not differ in any
material respect from Dr. Epperson's opinions. Id., p. 19. First, if Dr. Brzusek's opinions truly
did not differ from Dr. Epperson's opinions in any material respect, then his opinions were
cumulative and inadmissible on that basis.

Second, a similar argument was discussed and

rejected in Carnell v. Barker Mallagement, Inc., where the plaintiff argued the defendants were
aware of the identity of their retained expert and, that the witness would eventually develop
expert opinions addressing causation.

See 137 Idaho at 327-328.

See also § B(3), supra.

Finally, Zylstra did not raise this argument before the trial court. Arguments raised for the tirst
time on appeal will not be considered. See Patterson v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 151
Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718,729 (2011).
In opposition to BSU's motion to strike, Zylstra argued that "the salient opmlOns
contained in Dr. Brzusek's affidavit, which defense counsel asserts had not been previously
disclosed at all, had been disclosed on a April 8 and/or on April 29." R. Vol. I, p. 623. In
support of his motion for continuance, Zylstra again argued that Dr. Brzusek was listed as an
expert on April 8 and that list was supplemented on April 29. R. Vol. I, p. 720. At the October
10, 2013 hearing Zylstra also argued, for the first time, that "full disclosure" of scheduling
problems with Dr. Brzusek was made to BSU during the May 9 motion to compel hearing,
allegedly advising BSU and the trial court that Dr. Brzusek's opinions could not be
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supplemented until after June 10, to which BSU did not object. Tr. Vol I, P. 121, L. 9
L.12. Neither of these statements are supported by the record.

p. 122

S

Zylstra's List of Experts identifIed Dr. Brzusek as an osteopath who "may be called to
testify on issues of liability and damages ... " R. Vol. I, p. 33. Further, it was expected that "if
called," Dr. Brzusek would testify regarding the applicable standard of care and "may also testify
regarding the likelihood that Plaintiff suffered additional injury during subsequent matches ... "
R. Vol. 1, p. 34. Nothing further was provided regarding the doctor's opinions on causation until
his affidavit was submitted in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment. R. Vol. I, p.
508-538. In Zylstra's brief, he argues that Dr. Brzusek's opinions were supplemented on April
29,2013, to include the following disclosure regarding causation: "In particular he will testify
that the medical literature confIrms that allowing an athlete to retum to competition before his
brain injury has had time to recover can lead to multiple brain injuries, or death, that could have
been avoided with proper rest." Appellant's Br., p. 28. Zylstra's supplemental list of experts
provided on April 29, 2013, is not in the record. Nevertheless, the quoted language above, at
most, discloses Dr. Brzusek's opinion regarding general causation. It is not an opinion regarding
specitlc causation and whether retuming to competition before his alleged brain injury had time
to recover actually caused Zylstra's alleged cognitive detlcits. That opinion was not disclosed
until Zylstra submitted Dr. Brzusek's aHldavit in opposition to BSU's motion for summary
judgment.

During the October 10, 2013 hearing the trial court advised
recording of the May 9, 2012 hearing. Counsel was advised
Dr. Brzusek did not appear and there was nothing on the
comments had been erased. Tr. Vol I, p. 144 L.18 - p. 145, L.

8

counsel that is had listened to the
his alleged statements conceming
recording suggesting his alleged
3.
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In his atTidavit, for the first time, Dr. Brzusek ofTered an opll1!On regarding specific
causation. He testified:
Accordingly, it is my opinion, expressed with reasonable medical
certainty, that allov/ing Sam to continue wrestling immediately
after the timeout and then for three matches later that day and the
next, caused additional damage and prolonged his symptoms,
based on the literature that reveals the damage that additional
physical exertion can cause immediately after a concussive
incident, and the statistical likelihood that Sam would have
recovered fully if he had been pulled from the tournament and
allowed to rest until his symptoms disappeared ...
R. Vol. I, p. 512-513.
Since Plaintiff had not previously disclosed any of Dr. Brzusek's opinions regarding specific
causation prior to submitting his affidavit, this opinion was clearly a "new" opinion. 9
Furthermore, Zylstra never informed BSU that he was having any difficulty scheduling
an appointment with Dr. Brzusek and, therefore, BSU never agreed or acquiesced in allowing
Zylstra to supplement Dr. Brzusek's opinions after June 10,2013. In fact, at the May 9, 2013,
hearing on BSU's motion to compel, Zylstra represented that Dr. Brzusek was only a consulting
expert which he mayor may not call to testify. It was Dr. Heygyvary that Zylstra represented he
was going to see in June. Counsel advised the court:
Dr. Brzusek right as of now he is a consulting expert we may call.
We did disclose some basic outlines of what he might testify to.
Where our client is in Seattle this summer, you may see Dr.
Brzusek. Dr. Brzusek is a physician in Bellevue. That actually
that's Dr. Brzusek. If Dr. Brzusek believes an examination is
necessary, then it will be done and in which case we will timely
supplement and provide that report. Dr. H-e-y-g-y-v-a-r-y
I
won't try to pronounce that - is to see Mr. Zylstra in June of this

Dr. Brzusek's reference to "additional damage", like the affidavit of Dr. Epperson, fails to
describe the additional damage. This aspect of his affidavit is incomplete as it fails to fully
disclose his opinions. Standing alone, his opinion on this issue is conclusory and inadmissible.
See Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Serv., supra.

9
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year in Seattle. And when that occurs we will then timely provide
that report.
Vol. I, p. 16, L. 8-20.
Accordingly, as of May 9, it was still undecided whether Zylstra would ever see Dr.
Brzusek or whether the doctor would be anything other than a consulting expert as opposed to a
trial witness. Zylstra reiterated this point.
And so what I'm saying is we have provided everything that we
have so far. Dr. Brzusek, if he determines that he needs to see and
examine him, there will be a supplementation which will include
that report.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 19, L. 17-21.
Moreover, Zylstra made this same argument during the hearing on his motion for
continuance. The trial court took a recess to listen to the recording of the May 9, 2013, hearing
and informed Zylstra that no such representation occurred. Tr. Vol. I, p. 144, L. 18

p. 145, L.3.

Zylstra then expressed his concern the recording stopped early or otherwise did not pick up his
comments. Tr. Vol. I, p. 162, L. 7

-~

p. 163, L. 6. The trial court specifically informed Zylstra

that the recording actually continued into the next hearing and it was clearly stated that Dr.
Brzusek was only a consulting expert who mayor may not see Zylstra at some unspecified time
that summer. Tr. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 7 - p. 164, L. 2. The transcript reflects the trial court's
representation of the testimony during the motion to compel hearing. Yet, incredulously. Zylstra
continues to argue he represented to the trial court and BSU during the May 9 hearing that
Zylstra was set to see Dr. Brzusek on June 10, despite the fact the record is completely devoid of
any support for that statement.
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(3) Zylstra could not have reasonably believed that supplementing his expert's
opinions after the dispositive motion deadline was timely.
Zylstra argues that since the trial court did not impose a deadline for supplementing his
expert disclosures, his supplementation after BSU filed its motion for summary judgment was
timely. Appellant's Br., p. 20-23. Based upon his beliefit was understood Zylstra was to see Dr.
Brzusek in June, "Sam's counsel decided it made sense, consistent with their understanding of
'seasonable supplementation,' to await Dr. Brzusek's written report before providing his opinion
and further supplementation, as necessary, of their other experts' opinions." Appellant's Br., p.
20-21. This position was unreasonable in light of the discovery deadlines and the hypothetical
BSU posed during the motion to compel hearing.
The trial court issued is Order Goveming Proceedings and Setting Trial on July 13, 2012
("Scheduling Order"). R. Vol. I, p. 21-25. The Scheduling Order set the trial to commence on
September 30, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 21. Plaintiff's expe11 disclosure deadline was 180 days before
trial, or by April 3. 2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 23. All discovery was to be initiated 120 days before trial,
or by June 2, 2013. Id. Dispositive motions were to be filed so they could be argued 90 days
before trial, or by July 2, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 22. Since summary judgment motions needed to be
heard by July 2, 2013, they needed to be filed by June 4, 2013, in order to comply with Idaho
Rule of Ci vii Procedure 56( c).
At the May 9, 2013 motion to compel hearing, the trial court explained its interpretation
of the interplay between IRCP 26(b)( 4) and the expert disclosure deadline to mean a party is
entitled to discover the information allowed under Rule 26(b)(4), but only if requested through
an intelTogatory, request for production, or deposition. Tr. Vol. I, p.ll, L. 1

p. 14, L. 16. The

trial court further explained that the obligation to provide that information was a continuing
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obligation that must be supplemented both before and after the expert disclosure deadline. /d.
The trial court reviewed Zylstra's List of Expe11s and agreed they were insufficient to answer
BSU's specific discovery requests seeking disclosure of the expert's opinions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18,

L. 18

p. 19, L. 8. The trial court then indicated it would not rule on the motion to compel, but

believed it put all parties on notice of how it interpreted and would apply the discovery and
expe11 disclosure requirements. At that point, BSU posed the following hypothetical:
MR. COLLAER: One question I have in clarification, Judge, is the
issue that I have is - not to say it happens in this case, but it often
does and it may come up in this case, is an issue the plaintiffs
prima facie case will require expert testimony. And at the time of
close of discovery and time for filing motions for summary
judgment, when that time comes, if that opinion has not been
disclosed, it would be my position and I'd welcome your input
on this - that if the motion is filed and it raises that point, a
disclosure at that point to respond to the motion for summary
judgment would engender a motion to strike, which I hope would
be granted, and the record would be what it is.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L. 10-24.

It was clear by this hypothetical, that BSU was concerned Zylstra would fail to
supplement his expert disclosures and/or discovery responses to disclose the actual opinions held
by his experts prior to the dispositive motion deadline. The trial court indicated that while it
would not rule in a vacuum, it would have to be an extraordinary situation for it to allow
someone close to trial to change expert opinions such that it would prejUdice the other side and it
assured the parties that it would enforce the rules.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 25, L. 1-22. This colloquy

clearly advised and warned Zylstra that if he attempted to introduce new expert opinions
regarding a prima facie element of his case after the close of discovery, and after BSU filed its
motion for summary judgment, a motion to strike those opinions would be filed which the trial
court would entertain absent an extraordinary situation. Considering discovery closed on June 2,
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2013, and the last date for filing dispositive motions was June 4, 2013, it was unreasonable for
Zylstra to believe that he could supplement his expeli disclosures to introduce new and
previollsly undisclosed opinions regarding causation after June 4, 2013.

(4) There was no "implicit agreement" to extend the deadline for Zylstra to disclose
expert opinions
Unjustifiably, Zylstra argues there was an "implicit agreement" that discovery was
ongoing, presumably to imply that there was an agreement that he could provide new expeI1
opinions after the close of discovery. Appellant's Br., p. 19. He contends that communications
between the parties persuaded him that additional discovery would be conducted. [d.

While

this contention is unsupported by the record, even if it were true, an agreement to conduct
additional discovery does not equate to an agreement that he could disclose new opinions
regarding causation after the close of discovery and after the summary judgment motion had
been filed. Either way, Zylstra'S claim does not stand up to scrutiny.
Zylstra only cites to one email communication as support for his contention of an implicit
agreement. Appellant's Br., p. 19; R. Vol. I, p. 706. In that email, dated June 3, 2013, Zylstra
simply states that "we need to discuss and make decisions about mediation and further discovery,
particularly expert discovery." R. Vol. I, p. 706. While BSU's response to that email is not in the
record, Zylstra acknowledges that it did not address the issue of further discovery. Appellant's
Br., p. 19. Since that is the only communication relied upon by Zylstra, and BSU did not respond
to it, it cannot stand for the proposition that there was an agreement between the parties, implicit
or otherwise. This is especially true given the fact BSU filed its motion for summary judgment
on June 4, 2013, the day after this email, arguing that Zylstra did not have the requisite medical
opinions on causation to prove his prima facie case.
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On July 12,2013, BSU notified Zylstra that its liability expert had a conflict of interest
and had to be withdrawn. R. Vol. I, p. 708. Zylstra argues that this is further evidence of an
Implicit agreement that expert discovery was ongoing. Appellant's Br., p. 19-20. However,
Zylstra argues that he relied upon the alleged implicit agreement to justify disclosing his expert
opinions on causation with his opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment on July 1,
2013. Since BSU did not withdraw its liability expeli until after Zylstra filed his opposition, he
could not have relied upon that withdrawal when deciding to wait until tiling his opposition to
disclose his expert's new opinions.
Furthermore, Zylstra's claim of an implicit agreement becomes even more specious when
considering BSU's attempts to obtain timely disclosure of his expert's opinions. Zylstra's expert
disclosures were originally due on April 3, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 23. The week prior, Zylstra
requested an extension of time to disclose his experts, to which BSU indicated that it could not
agree to a lengthy extension. R. Vol. I, p. 123. On April 2, 2013, Zylstra again requested an
extension of time to disclose his experts. R. Vol. I, p. 123. BSU agreed to extend the disclosure
deadline to April 8, 2013, and specifically indicated that "the expert disclosure must comply with
IRCP 26(b)(4)." R. Vol. I, p. 122.
Zylstra provided his List of Experts on April 8, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 32-38. On April 10,
2013, BSC sent Zylstra a letter requesting immediate supplementation of his disclosures because
they did not provide a complete statement of his experts' opinions in compliance with Rule
26(b)(4) or in response to BSU's discovery requests. R. Vol. I, p. 126-127. When Zylstra failed
and refused to supplement his expeli disclosures, BSU filed a motion to compel seeking a court
order requiring him to provide a complete statement of his experts' opinions and the bases for
those opinions. R. Vol. I, p. 39-40. During the motion to compel hearing, BSU presented the

RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS STATE OF IDAHO, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY'S
RESPONSE BRIEF - 28

court with a hypothetical indicating it would move to strike any new expe11 opinions submitted
after its summary judgment motion was filed. Tr. Vol. I, p. 24., L. lO-24. When Zylstra filed new
expert opinions in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment, BSU moved to strike
those opinions. R. Vol. I, p. 565-577. BSU's conduct clearly indicates that it was, at all times,
attempting to obtain a complete statement of Zylstra's experts' opinions in a timely manner and
in accordance with the deadlines set f0l1h in the Scheduling Order. BSU's conduct does not
support Zylstra's contention that there was an implicit agreement whereby he could submit new
and previously undisclosed opinions after the close of discovery or after BSU filed its motion for
summary judgment.
D.

Any Suggestion of Judicial Bias is Frivolous.
Zylstra asserts that the trial judge was biased as an alternative basis for overturning the

district court's decision to strike the Epperson and Brzusek affidavits. A claim of judicial bias,
absent a motion to disqualify the judge below, will not be considered on appeal. Sanchez v.

State, 2013 WL 6004169,*6 (CLApp. 2013); Johnson v. lMcPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 469, 210 P.3d
563, 577 (CLApp. 2009); See also IMcPheters v. ilJa ile, 138 Idaho 391, 396-97, 64 P.3d 317,
322-23 (2003). Zylstra did not tile a motion to disqualify the trial judge. Therefore, he cannot
claim judicial bias for first time on appeal.
Even if the Court decides to consider Zylstra's new argument, he has not satisfied the
legal standard for proving judicial bias. In Bach v. Bagley, this Court explained that "unless
there is a demonstration of 'pervasive bias' derived either from an extra judicial source or facts
and events occuning at trial, there is no basis for judicial recusal." 14g Idaho 784, 792, 229 P.3d
1146, 1154 (2010) citing Liteky v. United States, 5lO U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474
(1994). This Court quoted with approval the following language from Liteky:
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It is enough for present purposes to say the following: First,
judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias
or partiality motion '" and can only in the rarest circumstances
evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required ....
Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for
recusal. Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a
bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of the trial
that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge....
A judge's ordinary etTorts at courtroom
administration even a stem and short-tempered judge's ordinary
efforts at courtroom administration remain immune.
Id., quoting Liteky, 540 U.S. at 555-556, 114 S.Ct. at 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d at 490-9\.
Therefore, the standard to prove judicial bias, "based simply on information that [the judge] has
learned in the course of judicial proceedings, is extremely high." [d.
Zyltra's claim of judicial bias is based only on the judicial remarks made during the
various hearings and the fact he was not allowed to introduce new expert opinions to oppose
summary judgment. The remarks upon which Zylstra relies do not demonstrate any judicial bias.
They are all trivial in nature and had no bearing on the district court's decision to strike the
expert affidavits or grant summary judgment. Some of the remarks had even been corrected by
the district court during the hearings. For example, Zylstra contends the district court was biased
because it stated there was 120 days to provide notice of a tort claim under the Idaho Tort Claims
Act rather than 180 days.

Appellant's Br., p. 25.

However, during the summary judgment

hearing, the district court corrected itself when it stated: "And for the record. I keep saying 120.
I apologize. It's 180." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 99, L. 2-3.
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Also, Zylstra contends that the district court's statements that trial was six weeks a\vay is
evidence of bias because the trial was actually seven weeks and four days away. Appellant's Br.,
p. 25. However, the district court corrected itself on this statement as well: "And like I said, I
don't think it's appropriate to have experts meeting with your client for the first time after
discovery and just

really just prior to trial. Trial

the jury trial date

the summary judgment

hearing was August 8 th , seven weeks and a few days before triaL" Tr. Vol. I, p. 165, L. 8-14.
Zylstra takes exception to the district court characterizing seven weeks as being "just
prior to triaL" Appellant's Br., p. 26. Yet, the fact is, seven weeks before trial is really "just
prior to tria!."

This is especially true considering the case had been pending for seventeen

months and Zylstra knew, or should have known, that medical expert opinions were necessary to
establish causation not only for liability, but also to show the deadline for filing his notice of tort
claim should be tolled.
Moreover, vlewmg the record as a whole, the district court actually gave Zylstra
favorable rUlings.

First, it did not enter a ruling on BSU's motion to compel even though it

stated that Zylstra's expert disclosures and discovery responses were insufficient. Tr. Vol. I, p.
18, L. 18

p. 19, L. 8; p. 23, L. 24

p. 25, L. 9. Second, the district court also ruled in Zylstra's

favor on the motion to strike pOliions of his lay witness affidavits. Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 22

p.

80, L. 8. Finally, the district court ruled in Zylstra'S favor on a significant issue on summary
judgment, finding an issue of fact existed as to whether the deadline for filing his notice of tort
claim should be tolled. In fact, the district court explained that it "went out on a very long limb
to deny summary judgment on that issue." Tr. Vol. I, p. 140, L. 3-5.
When reviewing the record as a whole it is evident the district court was not biased in any
way. The district court rendered procedural, admissibility, and substantive rulings in Zylstra's
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favor throughout the proceedings.

The evidence of bias relied upon by Zylstra is either

inaccurate and/or trivial and had no bearing on the outcome of the case. There has certainly been
no demonstration of a " pervasive bias" by the judicial remarks made by the district court.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the ruling of the district court striking the affidavits of
Drs. Epperson and Brzusek offered in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment should
be affirmed.
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